
Java Earthquake 2006/7

PART I - Early Recovery Activities



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1 Introduction

This report reviews the activities of the early recovery cluster during the recovery phase in Java following the 27 May 2006 earthquake. It reviews the mechanisms used for coordination and developing joint strategy as well as implementation for three core areas of early recovery including shelter/reconstruction, livelihoods and disaster risk reduction.

This report forms part one of a two part evaluation of the Java earthquake response. Part two 'Evaluation of the Cluster System for the Java Earthquake 2006/7', analyses the results of a satisfaction survey for those who participated within the cluster system in Java. This document is published separately at

<http://www.un.or.id/yogya/docs/Evaluation%20of%20the%20Cluster%20system%20in%20Java.doc>).

2 Relief to recovery – why was it so quick?

Before examining the performance of the early recovery response in Java in detail, it is worth briefly reviewing progress in post-earthquake Java in order to situate the role and actions of the humanitarian community within a wider context.

One year after the earthquake, there has been a substantial economic recovery and reconstruction is at an advanced stage. The reasons for such a fast recovery are twofold; firstly, there were limitations concerning the impact of the disaster that have mitigated its effect that were not perhaps apparent at the start of the emergency response. Secondly, recovery and reconstruction activities have been well-targeted and delivered efficiently using methods that differ from traditional relief models. These issues are discussed in summary below.

- **Damage to infrastructure was low.** While damage to housing and private infrastructure was huge, damage to road and telecommunications infrastructure was small. Planning, assessment and delivery of aid were made much easier as a result. Furthermore, the disaster had occurred within easy reach of the sizeable Javanese construction industry, which meant human and material resources were readily available for the relief and recovery effort.
- **Local government was strong and largely unaffected.** The provincial governments of the affected areas, Yogyakarta and Central Java, are among the strongest in Indonesia and were not significantly damaged by the disaster. As a result,

coordination, management and action from Government in recovery and reconstruction phases were strong.

- **Community social structures were left intact.** The majority of social structures at the community and village level recovered within several months. This has meant it has been possible to rapidly decentralise disaster management tasks such as detailed damage assessment, beneficiary targeting and measures to ensure accountability.
- **Self help culture, no aid dependency.** The strength of society in Yogyakarta and Central Java has meant that many affected families solved their own problems independently of external assistance. There is further little evidence of aid-dependency, which is extraordinary in its own right.
- **Human casualties were comparatively low.** Compared with the extensive damage, human casualties were remarkably low. Resulting in comparatively low levels of trauma and functional human resources for reconstruction
- **Population displacement was negligible.** Perhaps of greatest significance, population displacement away from homesteads was very limited¹. This meant that land tenure was a minor issue for reconstruction, has allowed a rapid social recovery and has further meant that community-based reconstruction assistance could start immediately in many places.

These factors combined have meant that the largest need from an early stage in the response after immediate lifesaving activities was the repair of damage to privately-owned, physical infrastructures. It is further fair to say that the level of need in other sectors (eg social service clusters) correlate strongly to the level of housing damage level in any one area. These combined characteristics set Java distinctly apart from other major post-disaster contexts elsewhere in the region and the response to the disaster was consequentially labelled 'shelter-led'.

Despite these mitigating circumstances, however, the extent of damage remained significant and presented a major challenge to relief and recovery efforts. In this regard, the manner and mechanism of the response have also greatly impacted upon the speed of the recovery. Four salient features of the response include:

- **Government funding and involvement in reconstruction was significant.** The Government of Indonesia made available substantial resources for housing reconstruction. This has not only provided funds to meet the greatest need beyond

¹ Estimated to be less than 5,000 households by September 2006

the emergency phase but has also assumed the responsibility for strategy and coordination.

- **Permanent reconstruction started in earnest after 6 months.** The Government housing programme, a community-based initiative using direct cash grants to the community, has resulted in culturally-appropriate housing, empowered affected communities and proved to be one of the fastest reconstruction programmes of recent times². While there are remaining concerns that progress has been too fast and at the expense of construction quality and safety, hundreds of thousands of stronger houses have been constructed in just over a year³.
- **Housing reconstruction programmes revived the economy within 12 months.** Of equal significance is the economic impact of the housing programme, which by injecting a huge amount of cash into local markets to build houses has produced a substantial economic recovery in its own right⁴.
- **Emergency and recovery activities effectively 'bridged the gap'.** Finally, coordinated and targeted interventions with clearly defined goals from humanitarian and recovery actors have effectively bridged the gap in a number of key sectors before the mobilisation of reconstruction funds. This has safeguarded the health and dignity of hundreds of thousands of the poorest and most vulnerable families affected, and further contributed to the speed of housing reconstruction and return to work⁵.


² The Government's housing programme was based upon the World Bank's long term housing programme, P2KP.

³ The activities and progress of the Multi-Donor Fund are described in *Java One Year after the Earthquake and Tsunami: Achievements of the Reconstruction and Results of the Java Reconstruction Fund* (World Bank, May 2007). The performance of the Government's housing programme are described in *Laporan Pemantauan dan Evaluasi Satu Tahun Pelaksanaan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Pasca Bencana Gempa Bumi di Wilayah Provinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta dan Provinsi Jawa Tengah* ('Report on the Monitoring and Evaluation on the One Year Implementation of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of the Post-Earthquake Disaster in the Province of Yogyakarta Special Region and the Province of Central Java') (Bappenas May 2007). Neither document, however, reviews the critical issue of structural strength of housing. The Tim Technis National will report on this issue later in 2007.

⁴ Refer to UNDP livelihoods report <http://ochaonline2.un.org/yogyakarta>

⁵ Refer to the Cluster Atlas (UN 2007) in Appendix B which describes the policy development and achievements of the humanitarian community through the cluster system in support of the relief and recovery effort in Java.

Figure 1 Funding inputs for relief recovery and reconstruction activities following the Java earthquake⁶




From a financial perspective, the role of cluster members was minor compared with Government⁷. The total estimated value of programmes from the 85 largest cluster agencies is USD 175 million, accounting for just over 20% of total inputs for all activities in all sectors and phases (see figure above and refer to Appendix C). The majority of this total has now been spent, and most of the large non-governmental agency programmes have now closed, or will be closing over the coming months. Consequentially, cluster involvement in long term reconstruction activities is now small. As a result of this and the general progress in recovery, UN-led coordination in support of the disaster finished in May 2007⁸.

⁶ Cluster funding was based upon financial data from the 85 largest agencies running assistance programmes in May 2007. For further details refer to *Cluster Atlas UN HC/RC, May 2007*.

⁷ 'Cluster' and 'cluster members' are referred to in this report as the community of non-Indonesian government actors who implement humanitarian and recovery activities. While Government is clearly a key part of each cluster in terms of leadership and implementation, it is necessary to describe them exclusively for the purposes of brevity for this report.

⁸ The coordination centre in Yogyakarta was part of the UN HC/RC office. Coordination structures are described in more detail in Chapter 4.

Funding Growth by Organisation Type



When the growth in funds by organisation type is examined, it is clear that there have been significant increases across the board, although the most significant increases come from international NGOs (over 800% increase) and from the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies (600%).

The increase in NGO funding can, to a large extent, be explained by the fact that many NGOs were not part of the original ERP. Also, these funds may have been contributed or pledged soon after the disaster, but materialized in the form of concrete activities at a later stage. In general, however, there does appear to be a general trend of NGOs being funded later in the response phase for relief and recovery activities. Although there are overlaps with allocations made in June 2006 for the 'emergency' and with later funds dedicated for 'reconstruction', it is clear that around USD 80-90 million arrived after September 2006, and are now either disbursed, or are already committed for expenditure. The increased and sustained activity and output of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies in post-earthquake recovery programming is of particular significance in this regard.

This funding is clearly not "emergency response" nor strictly "reconstruction" funding, falling between the two categories in a transition phase. Neither the government nor the Humanitarian Coordinator currently has mechanisms to predict the scope of this funding within a national planning framework and presents a challenge for future disaster response in Indonesia.

Although there are overlaps with earlier and later phases of response, it is possible to deduce that around USD 115 million of these funds have been used in support of discrete recovery or transitional activities⁹. This is important, as it supports a clear understanding of early recovery (or simply 'recovery') as a distinct phase with its own funding and its own coordination needs beyond the emergency response and before Government and IFIs fully take over recovery and reconstruction activities.

Although the relief and recovery activities were overall successful, there are grounds for significant improvement in terms of efficiency and sustainable output of the clusters. On the premise that a similar evolution of funding may occur again in response to a future natural disaster, either in Indonesia or elsewhere, existing coordination structures need review. Further institutional support from within the UN family and from the wider humanitarian community is also required if such improvements are to be achieved.

⁹ Activities include transitional shelter and core housing, transitional schools & interim child protection measures. Figure for recovery activities is derived from subtracting the revised ERP response from September 2006 (USD 60 M) from total cluster funding tracked in April 2007 (USD 175 million).

3 Evaluation of Early Recovery Cluster Activities

Early recovery activities have been undertaken in all sectors as agency programmes have naturally evolved to reflect the progression from relief to development needs. Three areas in particular, however, have formed to focus of the recovery phase in Java. These areas are shelter/reconstruction, livelihoods restoration and disaster risk reduction. Figure 2 below summarises the main activities undertaken within each category.

Figure 2 Early recovery activities in Java¹⁰

Shelter and Reconstruction	Livelihoods	Disaster Risk Reduction
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergency shelter ‘safety net’ • Transitional shelter/core houses for poor and marginalised families • Information campaigns for environmental health and building safety 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recovery of small and micro-businesses • loans and grants to replace assets and supplement working capital • Skills training • Activities in fisheries, garment manufacturing, food processing, agriculture, ceramics, handicrafts, leather making, furniture production, metal works, silver and jewellery, food processing, small traders & construction material suppliers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support to building code and building permit development[†] • Promotion of disaster preparedness in education curricula* • Construction skills training[†] • Community public outreach for safe building[†] • capacity building for local government for coordination and disaster management* • Site settlement and physical planning support to mitigate future earthquakes, flooding and avian flu risk*
<p>[†] within or linked to shelter and reconstruction cluster activities and strategy</p> <p>* linked to other cluster/sector coordination, including livelihoods and education</p>		

Note: Disaster risk reduction activities occurred within a number of sectors/clusters, but are described separately above as they were often funded discretely.

¹⁰ For a detailed description of all activities undertaken refer to Appendix B

3.1 Shelter and Reconstruction

Shelter and housing formed the bulk of assistance from government, the multi-donor fund and the clusters. To date, the government has funded the construction of 258,000 houses of which 140,000 houses are either complete or nearing completion (USD 600 million). The World Bank and the JRF have funded an additional 23,500 houses, of which 6,500 are complete. Another 8000 are due for completion by the end of August 2007 and a further 9,000 by the end of the year (USD 70 million). The emergency shelter cluster completed distributions of over 350,000 tarpaulins and tents as well as 45,000 clean-up toolkits from June to August 2006. Following this, the shelter and reconstruction cluster completed 80,000 transitional bamboo shelters and an additional 4,500 concrete frame core houses in nine months from August 2006 to April 2007 (USD 60 million). These combined achievements from all three sources represent 86% of total inputs.

While the construction of shelter and core housing described above was by no means the only output of the cluster, it used the greatest proportion of cluster resources¹¹. The cluster proved a useful tool to coordinate and deliver physical shelter assistance for several reasons. The cluster was large, with over 90 member organisations at its peak in September 2006. The need of the cluster members to meet to discuss strategy, overall shelter need, geographic coordination and government housing policy was acute. This meant that the coordinating body and those who chose to participate in the cluster had roughly equal needs and roles in sharing information and knowledge. As a result working relationships were initiated early and sustained during the recovery effort.

In addition, the majority of cluster members were also members of the emergency shelter cluster which was created several months earlier. This meant that decision-making structures were already in place for a number of cluster functions, including technical working groups for material specification and environmental issues, and a small strategic advisory panel, whose members were self-selected by the cluster. IFRC and UNDP chose to jointly run meetings for a period of six weeks to ensure an efficient transition of responsibilities from emergency to recovery shelter activities. Particular efforts were made to ensure for a robust handover of information management assets. A number of other working groups were also later formed including groups to develop construction skills training and disaster risk reduction activities linked to the construction sector.

Despite the large number of agencies choosing to participate in this cluster, the number of cluster agencies with large shelter programmes was small. Furthermore, these larger programmes were led by managers who had recent experience of disaster response from elsewhere in the region and further created good working relations with communities and civil society organisations at the start of their activities. To further assist further with coordination,

¹¹ Refer to the Cluster Atlas (UN 2007) in Appendix B which describes the policy development and achievements of the humanitarian community through the cluster system in support of the relief and recovery effort in Java.

a separate group (called the 'T5' group) brought together the five largest shelter and housing actors for bi-weekly meetings to resolve issues of gaps and overlaps and to discuss beneficiary selection criteria.

A shelter strategy, developed by the majority of cluster agencies, allowed individual funding proposals to be adjusted to adhere to cluster strategy and was also able to influence the funding decisions of the multi-donor fund. The strategy was also successful in influencing the internal budget reallocations to meet funding gaps for shelter. Reallocations within those relief organisations with large amounts of flexible funding, including the Red Cross, were particularly important.


Agreeing strategy with all actors, however, was not straightforward. Neither government nor the World Bank initially wanted to be directly involved with the large scale provision of transitional shelter and most humanitarian donors had no funds left by September 2006. Despite the huge need for shelter at this time, some from these organisations viewed such shelter as a waste of resources that would be better spent on permanent housing, on the premise that families would find some way to survive in the interim. These differences of opinion were resolved, and funds were later released from the multi-donor fund for transitional shelter, although with hindsight, things perhaps should be done differently.

Transitional shelter should be understood as primarily an emergency relief activity the delivery of which spills into the recovery phase. It is useful that IFIs and the government agree that transitional shelter can be part of permanent reconstruction, but the time taken for funds to be released from multi donor funds was too long. In this regard, the shelter clusters should encourage humanitarian donors to assume responsibility for funding during the emergency phase. In order to achieve this, clearer links need to be made earlier on at a strategic level between the aims and remit of emergency shelter and transitional shelter. If emergency shelter (in the case of Java this was largely tarpaulins and toolkits) is planned and understood as 'phase one' of transitional shelter assistance, there is a greater chance of minimising gaps in shelter provision (refer to figure 4). In Pakistan, a similar transitional shelter strategy was initiated four weeks after the emergency and which attracted substantial interest from the humanitarian donor community and the government. It is not hard to argue that an earlier start with transitional shelter would be possible in the future both here and elsewhere. Cost efficiencies compared with tents are clear (refer to figure 3).

Figure 3 Comparative costs of transitional shelter and tents in Indonesia



Figure 4 Transitional shelter/'extended emergency shelter'/'enhanced emergency shelter'



As previously mentioned, one of the keys to a successful recovery operation in Java was the lack of damage to social structures and the strength of Javanese communities. Certain actors in this cluster, however, proved better at working with community structures to provide assistance. There were two basic models of assistance in Java in all sectors in Java.

- **Community-based assistance**
- **Direct implementation/Implementation through partners**

Figure five summarises the main characteristics of the two models.

Figure 5 Two models of programme assistance in Java

	Community-based assistance	Direct implementation/ Implementation through partners
Assistance	Cash	In-kind/material assistance
Beneficiary selection	Communities lead the beneficiary selection process	Communities participate in the beneficiary selection process
Activities	Multi-sector assistance assessed and delivered jointly	Needs assessed and delivered separately sector-by-sector

In the context of assistance programmes in Java, 'community-based' means that a discrete group of families (who are linked socially) are given substantial responsibility by an agency to directly manage a pre-determined assistance budget granted in cash; to decide upon the type of support from a range of options in several sectors, to choose beneficiaries and to subsequently ensure transparency and accountability for the expenditure of any funds received. The agency then plays a supporting role in order to enable informed decisions to be made and to monitor community action.

This first model is set against 'direct implementation' and 'implementation through partners', where agencies using their own staff, or staff from a partner organisation, to work with the community to identify beneficiaries and deliver assistance. In Java, 'partners' have included universities or local NGOs. These later assistance types are perhaps more traditional relief response models, where the greater part of project control remains with the agency, including the complaints process. Further agencies using 'direct implementation' and 'implementation through partners' in the shelter sector have tended to provide in-kind assistance rather than cash. Further shelter has tended to be delivered separately from other assistance programmes such as livelihood support, water or sanitation.

These definitions are a little crude not least because all agencies will claim to run programmes that are 'community-based'. Whilst it is certainly true that a number of agencies operated in a manner that spans all definitions, those programmes that distributed cash, let communities self-select beneficiaries and offered to support a wide range of activities in a number of sectors can be considered more community-based than where other agencies have wielded tighter programme control.

Having made the case for a divergence in assistance strategy, it is now worth looking at relative performance and it is noteworthy that a number of 'community-based' multi-sector programmes have been particularly successful in Java. Examples include programmes implemented by PMI/IFRC and the housing and infrastructure programme implemented by the World Bank. Both these programmes were based upon cash grants to communities. Cash has not only proved to be the most flexible form of assistance but has also had a

significant impact on the recovery of the local economy. These programmes also prove that if cash grants are given to the right level of society together with mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability, the potential for corruption is reduced to acceptable levels. PMI/IFRC recorded losses of less than USD 500 from grants totalling over USD 10 million in Java. Similar performance for cash based assistance has also been recorded by CRS and IFRC in Pakistan in 2006.

Community-based assistance programmes, however, were not without their problems. Not all communities made equitable and fair decisions. The World Bank identified a number of villages where 'elites' had awarded themselves preferential access to funds for housing and other funds for village projects. Additionally, there were a large number of families who were regarded as not being part of their communities by leaders, and were consequently left off of beneficiary lists. Furthermore, using a community to identify needs and deliver assistance in relief and initial recovery phases proved nearly always a slower process than those relief agencies that employed their own human resources to do the job, at least in initial phases of assistance.

It is also necessary to point out that community-based programmes were not the only successful mechanism to deliver effective and timely assistance. Many agencies, particularly in the emergency phase, ran successful single-sector assistance programmes which were well-designed, flexible and ensured substantial community involvement in decision-making in partnership with their own staff or with staff from partner organisations.

It is also clear from recent evaluations, however, that several community-based assistance programmes achieved better results than programmes using other models of assistance in both emergency and recovery phases. A survey of shelter cluster programmes conducted by CHF in April 2007 indicates that beneficiaries who received support from agencies who provided community-based assistance reported fewer problems with shelter and significantly higher material reuse of the shelter and materials in permanent reconstruction. Further, recipients of community-based assistance returned to work the fastest.

The apparent success of community-based approaches to enable effective prioritisation of need and the procurement of quality materials is significant. Despite variation in performance of both community-based and 'direct' assistance models, the survey results tend to support the view that communities are better at deciding who should be assisted and are better at deciding upon quality when offered the chance to purchase for themselves.

This bears implications for the appropriateness of relief assistance models and the effectiveness of (or lack thereof) real time monitoring and evaluation of projects. Although beneficiary selection criteria were agreed upon, they were not verified in sufficient detail in the field, leading to gaps and overlaps in assistance between agencies working in neighbouring villages. Further, measures undertaken by several agencies (and the cluster lead) to promote

material quality in procurement stages have also proved inadequate, as clear differences in material performance and occupant satisfaction have emerged. These are two distinct areas of concern for future cluster-led response, particularly in the manner in which monitoring and evaluation is resourced and the level to which these tasks are decentralised.

3.2 Livelihoods

The initial estimate of damage and loss to the productive sectors following the earthquake was high. Few humanitarian donors, however, prioritised livelihood support activities in the emergency response. One might speculate that humanitarian donors do not regard livelihoods restoration as emergency work but there are other factors at work here. While macro-damage data was available to this cluster soon after the disaster phase, detailed assessments went lacking. Further, the formulation of a coherent cluster strategy took longer than expected due to delays in recruiting a livelihoods cluster lead. There were also misunderstandings between the cluster and the donors about what level of quantitative data would be required to support viable strategy upon which (NGO) programmes could then be funded. Reconstruction donors were consequentially hesitant to release funds.

While it may have been more difficult to assess needs for this 'sector' owing to the huge variety and number of businesses, under-funded non governmental organisations and other international organisations expected to be able to pitch for funds from the multi-donor fund based on qualitative field reports and assessments from limited emergency phase work. Further, these organisations wanted to start work on livelihood recovery projects with small funds as a way of 'testing the waters' to pave the way for larger grants to be awarded later (using past project performance as data for baseline need). This was perhaps a little naïve and drew criticism that the proposals submitted in November 2006 were driven by the 'supply' of under-funded NGOs rather than identified need. This outcome to some extent represents a failure of the cluster lead to present a timely and coherent strategy, but also with the NGOs in the cluster for not meeting the knowledge gap independently earlier on.

In the one year period since the earthquake, the cluster has delivered about USD 5.6 million worth of programmes (USD 6.7 million including agriculture inputs) through 23 international and national agencies, most of them non-governmental. Cluster activities have focussed upon the provision of grants and loans to replace working capital and assets together with skills training. Small and micro-businesses have been the primary target. Despite the limited funds available, a large range of enterprises have been supported, including fisheries, garment manufacturing, food processing, ceramics, handicrafts, leather making, furniture production, metal works, silver and jewellery, food processing, small traders and construction material suppliers. Activities have largely been located in the heavily damaged districts of Bantul and Klaten and to date have assisted around 23,000 households. Estimated average assistance per family is 100-150 dollars, after agency overheads and technical assistance components have been accounted for.

Set against estimated damage and losses, total assistance through this cluster was very small indeed. When the livelihoods cluster business survey returned results in April 2007, however, it revealed surprising results. There had been a substantial recovery in productive sectors; 50% of all businesses surveyed had returned to pre-earthquake level sales and 95% of all businesses were back to work. While a core of about 25% of the small and micro-enterprises (estimated to be 26,000 businesses in total) remained with sales of 50% or lower than pre-earthquake levels¹², this is a remarkably different picture of remaining need in this sector compared with the previous estimate.

It now appears that the damage and loss report significantly over-estimated both damage and losses for the productive sectors. Yet even accounting for this overestimate, it is clear that other factors are at play concerning the reasons for an economic recovery. In this respect, it is hard to ignore the government's housing programme, which has effectively injected USD 0.6 billion into communities at the grassroots level. While it is yet to be seen whether this is a sustainable recovery or a temporary spike in activity, it is hard to imagine how the remaining balance of inputs on offer from the multi-donor fund (USD 5-10 million) can really impact upon what has already been achieved given that the majority of livelihood recovery proposals on offer to the JRF at the time of writing use very similar targets and mechanisms of assistance as the housing programme (targeted cash grants to families who lost physical assets). The small grants projects aimed at small and micro-businesses have further carried project administration costs that are proportionally high and there is no clear evidence yet of the sustainable impact of these projects upon long-term poverty alleviation.

Further, underlying poverty is now a similar if not greater concern to those who have still to recover from the impact of the earthquake. Ten months after the disaster, the World Bank's livelihood consultant identified longer-term and more structural development opportunities with which to use the remainder of the multi-donor reconstruction funds. This is tangential to earthquake recovery and certainly widens the net of suitable implementing agencies to well beyond those of NGO and UN agencies, who have been vast majority of participating agencies at cluster meetings. This challenges who the livelihood cluster purports to represent and over which time period. It is clear that the livelihoods cluster lead was able to represent a large number of under-funded NGOs and UN organisations, but was not in a position to speak on behalf of the private and informal banking sector and other IFIs, such as IFC and ADB. These organisations should have been members of a livelihoods cluster in Java, whether acting as advisors or as project implementers.

To return again to the workings of the livelihood cluster as it stood and the activities that it undertook, it is worth looking again at its potential to be integrated into the community-based assistance model. If community-based programmes also include options for livelihood restoration (based on financial assistance and technical support) together with rehabilitation

¹² This group of 26,000 business now form the remaining 'of concern' group in term of the remaining recovery effort. There was no real indication of any one sector or business size being significantly more affected than the others.

of private infrastructures, there are clear grounds for pooling funds from other better-funded sectors with greater human resources and logistical support to support this work. Further, livelihood support activities in Java have also included activities in a number of sectors other than those listed earlier in the section. These factors combined indicate the livelihoods cluster could have a greater impact upon economic recovery if it worked through other sectors and concentrated upon its cross-cutting role rather than trying to carve out an independent space for itself with donors and the IFIs.

3.3 Disaster Risk Reduction

Disaster risk reduction programming in Java cross cut nearly all sectors. Key components have included:

- Development of building code legislation and building permit award process
- Augmentation and revision of education curricula to include disaster preparedness
- Construction skills training to skilled and semi-skilled workers
- Public outreach campaigns and creation of housing resource centres targeting communities at the family level to promote safe building techniques
- Capacity building to support coordination and early warning within local government structures
- Site settlement and physical planning advice for village reconstruction to mitigate risks from earthquakes and other risks including flooding and avian flu

The majority of funding for these activities has come through bi-lateral agencies such as GTZ and JICA. UNDP provided a platform to integrate these response activities into local government using internal funds.

As with the livelihoods sector, insufficient funds were allocated to these activities in the initial phases of response. This reflects an opportunity missed, particularly to influence the government housing programme, funds for which arrived and were subsequently disbursed before the programmes listed above could really take effect. Moves are afoot within the Government of Indonesia to tackle this issue, and are discussed in the next chapter. Humanitarian donors should follow suit.

4 Summary

Transitional shelter has proved to be a useful component of permanent reconstruction and has promoted an early return to livelihood activities. Independent surveys by the World Bank as part of the internal housing review process, as well as other cluster agency

surveys, indicate that occupant satisfaction and material reuse for transitional shelter has been very high overall¹³.

It is clear that shelter has reached many thousands of families who did not, and will not receive housing grants. Families on the margins of village society who were left off housing lists, those who live in rented properties with absentee landlords (who took the money and did nothing) and large, multiple-headed families for whom the standard housing grant does not cover their needs, have also benefited through the timely shelter programme. Hence, despite the progress in permanent housing reconstruction, transitional shelter has played a critical role in the ongoing recovery and reconstruction process¹⁴. The manager of the World Bank housing programme recommended that the Government of Indonesia should consider funding transitional shelter from its own funds in future disaster responses. This position provides grounds for building a closer working relationship with the IFIs in future disaster responses, both here in Indonesia and elsewhere.

Multi-sectoral, community-based approaches to disaster relief should be more actively encouraged by clusters. Advantages are broader than simply offering the potential for better quality assistance. When community-based programmes operate in a number of sectors in Java they have operated as *de-facto* grassroots inter-cluster forums, allowing the most pressing needs in a number of sectors to be identified and potentially addressed without the need for top down involvement from centralised coordination from authorities or clusters. The ability of a defined number of communities in any one area, supported by a single organisation, to assess and attempt to meet pressing needs for a range of sector requirements can substantially reduce coordination requirements, mitigate the problems of gaps and overlaps and ease the task of geographic coordination.

By using cash grants, there is also the potential to integrate livelihood support activities with other sector activities. PMI/IFRC has again led the way in proposing livelihoods activities linked to infrastructure repair and disaster risk reduction activities. This might be a way to release money for livelihood support earlier in the process, especially if linked directly with private infrastructure replacement and immediate 'life-saving' response.

There are a number of mitigating circumstances that have allowed community-based assistance to be successful from an early stage in post-earthquake Java. These circumstances include the negligible evidence of population displacement, the strength of local society and the culture of self-help, the near total absence of aid dependency and the lack of any lasting damage to social infrastructure. In addition, local markets for construction materials were largely restored after a few months, which meant cash assistance for private and communal infrastructure repair and replacement was a viable strategy. It must be highlighted that these conditions are by no means typical characteristics of post-earthquake

¹³ Refer to the Mid-term Review for JRF roof structure projects and CHF shelter satisfaction survey for 8 shelter agencies. Both surveys were conducted by UGM university and both remain unpublished at the time of writing.

¹⁴ '44,000 families still living in transitional shelter' Daily Kompas, Sunday, 13 May 2007


environments, and without them community-based assistance in Java would have been far more complex and markedly slower to deliver results on the ground.

*'Coordination between clusters should be improved, because sometimes cluster meetings are held in the same time, therefore small organizations who have a small number of staff have a difficulty in attending all meetings'*¹⁵

The existing cluster approach does not readily facilitate coordination for managers of multi-sector, community-based assistance programmes, because the clusters are organised along sectoral lines. While geographic coordination needs may be addressed, forming joint and coherent strategies between agencies - an equally important part of coordination - is made more complex. At a purely practical level, managers, or decision-makers for multi-sectoral community-based programmes find it difficult to attend four or five different cluster meetings which often overlap in timing, especially during the emergency phase, and maintain a meaningful involvement in more than one cluster. This is critical, as many policy and funding decisions concerning agency strategy is made during this period. Sporadic attendance by these key personnel at cluster meetings also works against forming essential working relationships with counterparts in other operational agencies and further hinders an ability to contribute meaningfully to cluster strategy development.

Many agencies in the relief sector are not currently well equipped or prepared to adopt a community-based multi-sector approach to relief. Many are mandated along delineated sectors, while others are committed to more direct mechanisms of implementation. Several large relief organisations in Yogyakarta have fought against these constrictions, but even those with programmes in many sectors and phases and clearly established connections with communities continue to conduct assessment and implementation on a sector-by-sector basis. As one agency head in Yogyakarta explained, getting sector leads to jointly plan assistance on a community basis was a 'daily nightmare'. This also reflects a more general trend about the way relief agencies hire a single staff member to provide technical advice and management for a programme within the bounds of a single cluster or sector.

¹⁵ INGO comment from cluster survey, refer to Appendix A



The overriding lesson learnt from the shelter and housing response to the Java earthquake is that emergency shelter, transitional shelter and permanent housing are all part of one reconstruction process from the perspective of disaster victims and beneficiaries and hence should be so organised by the government and other organisations providing assistance. Perhaps the most important aspect of emergency and transitional shelter in this process is that it has afforded affected families greater choice and control concerning their settlement options and more dignified living environments while communities, government and IFIs resource and plan for permanent housing solutions. Dignity and flexibility were qualities that both the Sultan of Yogyakarta and the Vice-President have appreciated about the shelter strategy employed in Yogyakarta¹⁷ as many families continue to live in a mixture of all three types of housing. 'One step' reconstruction is the right approach in situations where families are not displaced, but also means that transitional shelter is part of that one step. This is a very different situation from those where shelter is provided to those living in camp settlements in Pakistan or Aceh.

Some of the operational problems experienced in Java with shelter, housing and livelihoods result from a separation of reconstruction support into discrete products, which are delivered by different organisations over different time periods. Thus, the main barrier to achieving greater efficiency and quality of assistance is largely one of coordination.

¹⁶ Slide presented at the Humanitarian Reform Regional Workshop, Bangkok, 29-31 Jan 2007

¹⁷ *pers comm.* Hamengku Buwono X, April 2007

For the recovery of private physical infrastructure, such as shelter, housing, water and sanitation and the recovery of family-based livelihoods, it is clear that community-based, multi-sector approaches has been particularly successful in relief and recovery phases as well as the current reconstruction phase. Regardless of whether individual agencies use direct implementation or community-based relief assistance models, however, it is now clear that clusters involved in supporting shelter, housing, water and sanitation as well as livelihood restoration should have assessed, planned and delivered together. The cluster system as applied in Java failed to ensure systematic inter-cluster coordination and highlights the need for further refinement of the global cluster guidelines. The impact of this failure would certainly have been more acute if government had not acted with such speed and resources to meet housing needs.

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
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Appendix B – Cluster Atlas for the Java Earthquake

[http://www.un.or.id/yogya/docs/Cluster%20ATLAS%20Book%20Page1-41%20\(text%20only\).pdf](http://www.un.or.id/yogya/docs/Cluster%20ATLAS%20Book%20Page1-41%20(text%20only).pdf)

Appendix C - Financial Tracking Review Exercise, UN HC/RC Office Yogyakarta, April 07


Proportion of Funds per Cluster/Sector



Cluster Funding Evolution (in USD)

Cluster/Activity	Jun-06	Sep-06	Jan-07
Agriculture	700,000	0	895,543
Coordination	1,500,000	0	8,939,329
Disaster Risk Reduction	0	0	16,941,829
Education	320,000	1,650,000	18,520,084
Emergency Shelter	10,520,497	12,930,355	24,556,285
Livelihood	0	400,000	5,687,290
Health	3,657,265	3,770,909	24,752,817
Permanent Housing	0	0	14,742,499
Protection	60,000	1429674	3,789,230
Public Outreach	0	0	2,005,060
Watsan	2,776,326	5,759,866	15,608,005
Training	0	0	419,322
Shelter and Reconstruction	1,922,410.00	4,690,814.00	37,797,012
Totals	21,456,498	30,631,618	174,654,303

Funds per Cluster/Sector



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This report doubles as an end of mission report. As such, it is based upon personal experience as well as formal research and published reports as described in the appendices. Hence, the views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the UN HC/RC office in Indonesia.

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